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A NEW VIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Abner J. Mikva*

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES. 2d ed. By Hans
A. Linde, George Bunn, Fredericka Paff, and W. Lawrence Church.
Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press. 1981. Pp. lxvii, 887. $24.
There is something formidable about the blue buckram of a law
school casebook. Perhaps it is the color that, in context, can only
bring back haunting memories of the bluebooks that law student and
law teacher alike learned to dread. Perhaps it is the size or the absence of adornment that make a casebook an unlikely source for interesting reading. And yet for all that, Justice Linde and Professor
Bunn have, not once but twice - this time with the assistance of
Professors Fredericka Paff and W. Lawrence Church - produced a
law textbook that reads well.
Part of the credit must go to the subject matter. The legislative
process is, after all, politics. Compared with the effort demanded in
mastering the Rule in Shelly's Case or the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, learning about the political processes in law school is a pleasant
change of pace. Even when the legislative process is combined with
the more arcane administrative processes, the subject matter is still
choice. The need for teaching materials on how laws are made has
been one of the chief reasons for the dearth of law school courses on
the subject. This edition certainly fills a large portion of that gap.
I taught the legislative process in law school shortly before the
first edition came out, and would have used it had the authors been a
little less dilatory in getting it on the market. The second edition is
improved, and even a little leaner, notwithstanding four additional
years' worth of legislative history and administrative precedent. The
reasons for the leanness are mostly good - a sifting and winnowing
of some of the materials from the first edition that had gone too
deeply into subjects of interest only to the more specialized student
of politics. For example, how Congress or the state legislatures control their own membership and proceedings is covered by the in* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Ed.
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depth discussion of Powell v. McCormack, 1 thus allowing for a reduction of the discussion of other cases in point. (Justice Linde even
cut down the extent of the quotations from his law review article on
the case, an act of authorial self-abnegation not frequently encountered.)2 As a result, the quantum of material is just right for the
teaching of the course contemplated by the authors - three credit
hours in a good law school.
Having so easily and favorably disposed of the physical dimensions of the second edition, the dissection becomes more problematical, and its results are less likely to please the authors. First, I have
trouble with the combination of the legislative and administrative ,
processes in one book. True, such a combination does distinguish
this casebook from all of the competitors that continue to separate
Congress and the state legislatures from their administrative progeny.3 The distinctiveness of such an organization, however, comes at
the expense of blurring the boundary between articles I and II of the
United States Constitution and their counterparts in most of the
states. Sometimes the blurring is quite mischievous, as when the investigative power of Congress and that of the federal agencies are
meshed into a single chapter that leaves the reader and student
somewhat bewildered about whether the fourth amendment precludes the Congress from conducting unreasonable searches and
seizures or whether the fifth amendment protects a corporation from
having to incriminate itself before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Sometimes the combination leads to an area that needs
more detailed discussion than can be provided in a book that covers
both kinds of processes, as, for instance, in the handling of the due
process owed by administrative agencies to claimants appearing
before them. 4 Sometimes the format merely makes it more difficult
I. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). It is difficult to talk about the Powell case without getting into a
myriad of related subjects, as the 89 pages of Supreme Court opinions in the case attest. The
authors do raise some of the other questions of congressional self-discipline, but they resist the
temptation to write a book-within-a-book about the fascinating case involving the fascinating
Adam Clayton Powell and his fascination for going to exotic places at the taxpayer's expense.
2. The article, Comment on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 174 (1969), is one of
the best of the innumerable pieces about the Powell case.
3. There is no end to the "logic" of carrying through the legislative process to the "next
step." From the administrative agencies, one gets to the courts, which review agency decisions,
to the executive branch, which appoints the administrators, to the private sector, which has to
cope with the legislative, administrative, and legal decisions that are promulgated. All government and all law are intertwined, and the divisions for teaching purposes are somewhat arbitrary. But the alternative is one big law school course on "The Law." I am reminded that the
late Professor William Winslow Crosskey set out to do a law review article on the constitutional antecedents of the co=erce clause. He ended up with a two-volume work on the
Constitution, with a third volume put together posthumously by one of his assistants.
4. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), for instance, remains one of those enigmatic
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to understand how Congress (and the state legislatures) have themselves blurred the distinction - for example, with respect to the delineation between the independent regulatory agencies and those in
the executive branch. After several courses in law school, nineteen
years in the legislative branch, and several years on the bench, I still
am never quite sure about all that turns on that distinction. Considering the extent of the literature on the topic, it probably asks too
much of a casebook to cover the area while it is being used to teach
the budding lawyer all that he or she needs to know about the legislative and administrative processes of federal and state
govemments.5
This brings me to my second concern about the overbreadth of
the book. I am not sure that one can cover the federal and state
processes in the same casebook and in the same course. The authors
acknowledge the difficulty by stressing the need for more localized
materials to supplement their coverage of the state processes. Even
with such supplementation, I think the task is unmanageable. A
book could be written about the distinctions between federal
processes and those of any one state. Any number of books could be
written on the distinctive processes of the various states. When one
considers the history of the uniform law commissions, for example,
and the difficulties that they have encountered in trying to hold the
fifty states to a set of norms even after a consensus has been reached,
it is obviously very difficult to talk generically about how state legislative bodies and administrative agencies function. It should not
come as a surprise, therefore, to see most of the state examples coming from Oregon (where Justice Linde holds forth) and Wisconsin
(where Professor Bunn and the two new collaborators abide and
teach). Aside from the obvious parochialism, those two states probably reflect the cream of orderly process. Woe betide the lawyer who
walks into the Illinois General Assembly at Springfield expecting to
precedents from which all interested parties draw comfort or concern about what procedures
protect a government beneficiary from withdrawal of benefits. The case gets only indirect
coverage in the text, which could lead an unwary teacher or student to underestimate its importance and difficulties.
5. Should Congress or the executive branch exercise the same degree of oversight over
independent regulatory agencies and executive branch agencies? Should the various congressional veto mechanisms over rules and regulations be coterminous for both kinds of agencies?
These are particularly timely questions given the zeal for regulatory reform being shown on
Capitol Hill. The book only grazes the general area of the legislative veto, and does even less
about the "Bumpers" Amendment conundrum, concerning how much the judges should do by
way of watching over the rule-making process. My criticism goes not to the omission of these
questions, because inclusion of all the missing material could double the size of the book;
rather, it faults the authors' creation of the dilemma in the first place by combining legislative
and administrative processes in one casebook.
·
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see a replication of the Wisconsin Legislature. 6 Woe unto the New
York lawyer who expects his state's regulatory agencies to be as articulate and even-handed as an Oregon Commission.
Notwithstanding my complaints, I am aware that many law
schools give such short shrift to the legislative process (and even to
administrative law) that the practical choice is between a combination textbook such as this one and a few footnotes in a book on constitutional law. Considering how much of a practicing lawyer's time
will be spent reading and using statutes and regulations, it is distressing that so little time is spent in law schools telling students how
those statutes and regulations are made. It is almost as if our educators take too literally the old adage that legislation is like sausage: if
one wants to enjoy the consumption, one should never watch the
product being made.
As long as law continues to be taught largely by the case method,
an important measure of a teaching tool is how it handles cases. The
authors get high marks on that score. The acknowledged difficulty
with using cases to teach the fundamentals of law stems from the fact
that large portions oflegal opinions have nothing to do with the doctrinal fundamentals: much writing is devoted to a recitation of the
facts of the case, to handling of the make-weight arguments advanced by the parties, and to the procedural problems endemic to
every case. A concomitant problem is the general length of legal
opinions, about which I dare not cast the first stone. 7 It becomes a
real specialty for teachers and textbook writers to try to cut an opinion to manageable size without also cutting out much of what makes
it worth annotating. Nowhere do the authors show their art better
than in their encapsulation of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 8 In ten pages they capture the meat and the conclusions that
took the Supreme Court 132 pages to deliver in the first place. (Justice Linde had an advantage on that case, however: he was Justice
Douglas's law clerk at the time.)
Justice Linde enjoys other privileges not normally given to textbook authors. After many years of distinguished teaching at the
University of Oregon, Professor Linde became Justice Linde - a
6. There is a volume, not much shorter than Legislative and Administrative Processes, that
deals only with some efforts at reform of the legislative process in one state, Illinois. See
ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IMPROVING THE
STATE LEGISLATURE (1967),

7. There is a recent article pleading for a reduction in the length of judicial opinions; I
regard it as required reading, both for me and for my clerks. Gardner, Toward Shorter Opinions, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 240 (1980).
8. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

March 1982)

Legislative Process

577

member of the Supreme Court of Oregon. One of the Oregon cases
covered in the first edition was Board of Medical Examiners v.
Mintz .9 In Mintz, the Oregon Supreme Court said that the State
Board of Medical Examiners did not need to establish rules and regulations before revoking the medical license of a doctor charged with
performing an abortion. The authors asked some piercing questions
about the ratio decidendi of the Mintz decision, indicating a minimum of enthusiasm for the holding.
Mintz was covered in the second edition as well, but lo and behold! - after the discussion of Mintz, there appears the precis of
another case before the Oregon Supreme Court. In Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 10 "Linde J." ruled that the
dental board did have to establish some rules and definitions before
it could revoke the petitioner's license. What a glaring case of academic activism!
Dispassionate history seldom is written by its actors. Because I
was a member of Congress during the relevant periods, the following
comments must be taken with several grains of salt. I think that the
congressional reforms and changes that occurred in the 1970s will
have a substantial and lasting impact on the institution. Everything
from the anti-impoundment statute, to th.e statute setting up the
House and Senate budget committees, to the House rule changes
making it easier to get rid of committee chairmen, to the recordation
of votes on amendments and, perhaps most importantly, to the various sunshine proposals that opened up committee hearings and
markups to the press and public - all of these significantly altered
how legislation is made. 11 While Legislative and Administrative
Processes does contain references to specific changes in the budgeting process, there is not very much about the rest of the reforms.
Even more notable is the absence of discussion of the political and
social forces that bring about changes in the legislative process, either the ones that occurred in the 1970s or any of the earlier reform
movements in the Congress or the state legislatures. Parochial involvement aside, I think the substance of those changes, and the
political and social ferment that caused them, are very much a part
of understanding the process. No one can expect a single casebook
or a single course to provide an adequate explanation of the legisla9. 233 Or. 441, 378 P.2d 945 (1963).
10. 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980).
11. Internal reform efforts in Congress have been the subject of numerous articles. See,
e.g., Hopkins & Oleszek, Ninety-F!fth Congress: Legislative Reform in 1977, 64 A.B.A.J. 341
(1978). See generally LEGISLATIVE REFORM (L. Rieselbach ed. 1978).
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tive process to budding lawyers, but they should at least be taught to
suspect that there is an interaction between the process and national
moods, that elections do change the way things get done, and that
one cannot even find out where they sell legislative scorecards or
where the game is played if there is no awareness of the complex
interactions between the people and their representatives.
The above is not a pep talk designed to lead all law students to
contemplate a political career, although that is not such a bad idea.
Nor is it an argument for teaching more political science in the law
schools. Rather, it is an enlargement of the plea made above for law
schools to teach lawyers how to think about the legislative process.
The range of my comments about the book should make it clear
that I really wish the authors had written three or four books separating out the legislative and administrative processes as well as
the federal and state forums. It should be equally obvious that the
complaint starts from the premise that the authors possess the requisite skill to produce books worth teaching with and reading. When
all is said and done, law book writers do not create their material.
Their genius is in finding (and shortening) the right cases to stimulate discussion and thought about the broad principles of the law, in
excerpting the apt comments from the vast literature about those
cases and the law in general, in studding the text with pertinent and
impertinent questions and comments about the materials being
presented. Casebook writers are really collectors first and annotators
second - and the test is whether the collection and annotations can
tantalize lawyers-to-be so that they embark on a lifelong search for
answers to the hard questions.
It is on this account that Justice Linde, Professor Bunn, and their
collaborators deserve high praise for the second edition of their
casebook on Legislative and Administrative Processes. If there is to
be any adjustment in the present imbalance between the teaching of
how the common law was made and how the everyday,_ here-andnow statutory law is made, it will be accomplished through books
such as this one.

